This work stems from the European Directive on antitrust damages actions and enquires on the need to preserve the effectiveness of antitrust public and private enforcement within the framework of the relationship between the leniency programmes and actions for damages. As is well known, the leniency programmes allow companies involved in an agreement prohibited by competition law to cooperate with competent Antitrust Authority in order to disclose such an infringement and obtain the immunity or a reduction from fines. This generates the need to preserve the secrecy of leniency statements in order to not deter companies from using such a programme. The Directive provides, inter alia, that national courts can never order the disclosure of leniency statements and that joint and several liability is not applied to the company which has been granted immunity from fines. Therefore, within an action for damages, such a company enjoys the prior enforcement of other members of the prohibited agreement. However, this solution sacrifices excessively the other requirement imposed by European Law which is to ensure the effectiveness of actions for damages. This work criticizes the solution adopted in the Draft Directive. It opposes both the complete ban to disclose leniency statements, since it risks to affect the complementary role played by antitrust private enforcement with respect to antitrust public enforcement; and the rule on joint and several liability, because, if read in conjunction with the complete ban, grants an unfair advantage to the undertaking benefiting from immunity, to the detriment of the effectiveness of actions for damages. Therefore, the work proposes the application to damages action of the same exchange logic applied to leniency programmes within the administrative framework. As a consequence, the private plaintiff should be given access to leniency statements and, conversely, should lose the advantage granted by the new rule on solidarity; on the other hand, the defendant which has been granted immunity from fines should enjoy the beneficium excussionis rule and suffer the facilitation on the burden of proof granted to the claimant.
Il lavoro muove dalla recente Direttiva europea sulle azioni di risarcimento del danno antitrust per approfondire la questione concernente le esigenze di effettività del public enforcement e del private enforcement sollecitate dal rapporto tra il programma di clemenza e l’azione di risarcimento del danno. Il programma in esame consiste, com’è noto, nella collaborazione offerta a un’Autorità garante della concorrenza dall’impresa che partecipa a un’intesa vietata per ottenere in cambio l’immunità o la riduzione della sanzione. Ciò genera il bisogno di proteggere le informazioni offerte dall’impresa (c.d. leniency statements) dalla loro divulgazione per non dissuadere le imprese dall’utilizzo del programma. La Direttiva sul risarcimento del danno stabilisce, tra le altre cose, il divieto assoluto di accesso ai leniency statements unito alla deroga alla responsabilità solidale, nel senso che in sede risarcitoria l’impresa immune gode del beneficio di preventiva escussione delle altre imprese partecipanti all’intesa vietata. Di contro, questa soluzione sacrifica oltremodo l’ulteriore esigenza imposta dal diritto europeo di garantire effettività all’azione risarcitoria contro il danno provocato dall’intesa vietata. Di conseguenza, l’autore critica la soluzione in parola: il divieto assoluto d’accesso agli atti, poiché rischia di compromettere il ruolo complementare svolto dal private enforcement rispetto al public enforcement; la regola sulla responsabilità solidale, perché, se letta in combinato con il divieto assoluto di accesso, concede sul fronte giurisdizionale un vantaggio eccessivo all’impresa immune a scapito dell’effettività dell’azione risarcitoria del danneggiato. Viene proposta, quindi, l’applicazione anche in sede risarcitoria della logica dello scambio propria della leniency in sede amministrativa. In questo senso, nell’azione privata l’attore gode della possibilità di accesso ai leniency statements e sacrifica, per converso, il vantaggio legato alla regola della solidarietà; il convenuto immune può opporre al danneggiato il beneficium excussionis, tuttavia scontando l’agevolazione della prova concessa al danneggiato.
Programmi di clemenza e azione risarcitoria nella direttiva europea sul risarcimento del danno: convivenza possibile?
MONTANARI A
2014-01-01
Abstract
This work stems from the European Directive on antitrust damages actions and enquires on the need to preserve the effectiveness of antitrust public and private enforcement within the framework of the relationship between the leniency programmes and actions for damages. As is well known, the leniency programmes allow companies involved in an agreement prohibited by competition law to cooperate with competent Antitrust Authority in order to disclose such an infringement and obtain the immunity or a reduction from fines. This generates the need to preserve the secrecy of leniency statements in order to not deter companies from using such a programme. The Directive provides, inter alia, that national courts can never order the disclosure of leniency statements and that joint and several liability is not applied to the company which has been granted immunity from fines. Therefore, within an action for damages, such a company enjoys the prior enforcement of other members of the prohibited agreement. However, this solution sacrifices excessively the other requirement imposed by European Law which is to ensure the effectiveness of actions for damages. This work criticizes the solution adopted in the Draft Directive. It opposes both the complete ban to disclose leniency statements, since it risks to affect the complementary role played by antitrust private enforcement with respect to antitrust public enforcement; and the rule on joint and several liability, because, if read in conjunction with the complete ban, grants an unfair advantage to the undertaking benefiting from immunity, to the detriment of the effectiveness of actions for damages. Therefore, the work proposes the application to damages action of the same exchange logic applied to leniency programmes within the administrative framework. As a consequence, the private plaintiff should be given access to leniency statements and, conversely, should lose the advantage granted by the new rule on solidarity; on the other hand, the defendant which has been granted immunity from fines should enjoy the beneficium excussionis rule and suffer the facilitation on the burden of proof granted to the claimant.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
