In a Gaussian-quadratic economy with dispersed information, we correct the inefficiency in informa tion acquisition by making the tax rate on agents own actions contingent on actions themselves. This aligns individual and social evaluations of information quality. Our policy is robust to considering heterogeneous unobservable costs in information acquisition, since agents share a common evaluation of the benefit of information quality.
Efficient Information Acquisition with Heterogeneous Agents
Piccirilli G;
2021-01-01
Abstract
In a Gaussian-quadratic economy with dispersed information, we correct the inefficiency in informa tion acquisition by making the tax rate on agents own actions contingent on actions themselves. This aligns individual and social evaluations of information quality. Our policy is robust to considering heterogeneous unobservable costs in information acquisition, since agents share a common evaluation of the benefit of information quality.File in questo prodotto:
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