We run regression analyses on a hand-collected dataset including 507 IPOs on the UK Alternative Investment Market (AIM) from FY 2004 to FY 2010 and provide new empirical evidence that venture capitalists (VCs) do grandstand firms and strike quid pro quo agreements with underwriters, thus increasing the underpricing level. The grandstanding and spinning hypotheses also hold when controlling for IPO years and industries. We document that when VCs behave in this way they do not assume any certification role with respect to managed firms.

Grandstanding and spinning in VC-Backed IPOs on AIM UK

DELL'ACQUA, ALBERTO;
2012-01-01

Abstract

We run regression analyses on a hand-collected dataset including 507 IPOs on the UK Alternative Investment Market (AIM) from FY 2004 to FY 2010 and provide new empirical evidence that venture capitalists (VCs) do grandstand firms and strike quid pro quo agreements with underwriters, thus increasing the underpricing level. The grandstanding and spinning hypotheses also hold when controlling for IPO years and industries. We document that when VCs behave in this way they do not assume any certification role with respect to managed firms.
2012
GRANDSTANDING
SPINNING
IPOS
AIM
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12606/9232
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